The concept of group signature allows a group member to sign message anonymously on behalf of the group. In the event of a dispute, a designated entity can reveal the identity of a signer. Previous group signature schemes use an RSA signature based membership certificate and a signature based on a proof of knowledge(SPK) in order to prove the possession of a valid membership certificate. In these schemes, all of SPKs are generated over an unknown-order group, which requires more work and memory compared with a publicly-known-order group.
Introduction
A group signature proposed by Chaum and van Heyst 12) , allows a group member to sign messages anonymously on behalf of the group. A group signature has a feature of tracing, that is, the identity of a signer can be revealed by a designated entity in case of dispute. A group signature consists of three entities: group members, a group manager, and an escrow manager. The group manager is responsible for the system setup, registration and revocation of group members. The escrow manager has an ability of revealing the anonymity of signatures with the help of a group manager.
A group signature consists of six functions, setup, registration of a user, revocation of a group member, signature generation, verification, and tracing, which satisfy the following features: Unforgeability : Only group members are able to generate a signature on a message; Exculpability : Even if the group manager, the escrow manager, and some of group members collude, they cannot generate a signature on behalf of other group members; Anonymity : Nobody cannot identify a group member who generated a signature on a message; Traceability : In the case of a dispute, the identity of a group member is revealed by the cooperation of both the group manager † Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology and the escrow manager; Unlinkability : Nobody can decide whether or not two signatures have been issued by the same group member; Revocability : In the case of withdrawal, the group manager can revoke a member, and a signature generated by the revoked member cannot pass the verification; Anonymity after revocation : Nobody can identify a group member who generated a signature on a message even after a group member was revoked; Unlinkability after revocation : Nobody can decide whether or not two signatures have been issued by the same group member even after a group member was revoked. The efficiency of a group signature scheme is considered by the size of public key and signature, the work complexity of signature generation and verification, and administration complexity of revocation and registration of a group member.
In the next section, we provide an overview of related work.
Related work
Various group signature schemes have been proposed 1),2),4)∼6),8),9),11), 21) . These group signature schemes are classified into two types, a public-key-registration type, and a certificatebased type.
Public-key-registration type group signature scheme 6) uses only a known-order group and can easily realize the revocation by removing the group member's public key. However, both a group public key and the signature size depend on the number of group members. It be-comes serious if we apply them on large group.
The certificate-based type 1),2),4),5),8),9),11), 21) gives a membership certificate to group members, and the group signature is based on the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge(SPK) of membership certificate. These schemes are based on the following mechanisms. A user, denoted by M i , who wants to join the group, chooses a random secret key x i , and computes y i = f (x i ), where f is a suitable oneway function. M i commits to y i (for instance, M i signed on y i ) and sends both y i and the commitment to the group manager denoted by GM, who returns M i with a membership certificate cer i = Sig GM (y i ). To sign a message m on behalf of the group, M i encrypts y i to c i using the public key of the escrow manager denoted by EM, and generates a signature based on the proof of knowledge which shows the knowledge of both x i and cer i such that cer i = Sig GM (f (x i )). The verification is done by checking the signature of knowledge. The escrow manager can easily reveal the identity of a signer by decrypting c i . Therefore, neither a group public key nor signature size depends on the number of group members.
On the other hand, this type must make the member's certificate invalid when they revoke. This means that they need revocation mechanism independently. This is why the previous schemes 1),2),9),11) do not have any function of revocation. The schemes 4),5),8), 21) provide the function of revocation. In Song's scheme 21) , a membership certificate is valid for a limited period. Therefore, each group member has to update his/her membership certificate in each time period. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya's scheme 8) needs to update a membership certificate in both cases of registration and revocation. Thus, their scheme requires additional cost to manage the valid member although their verification does not depend on the number of registered or revoked member. On the other hand Bresson and Stern's scheme 5) uses a CRL to realize revocation. CRL is a public list of information related with revoked-member's certificates. This scheme does not have to update a membership certificate, but the size of group signature and the cost of signature generation and verification depend on the number of revoked members. Ateniese and Tsudik proposed quasi-efficient solution for CRL-based revocation 4) . CRL-based revocation scheme is based on the following mechanisms. The group manager computes V j = f (cer j ) for each revoked member M j by using a suitable one-way function f and publishes V j together with the current CRL. In the signing phase, a signer M i also sends T = f (f (cer i )) with a signature by using a suitable one-way function f . In the verification phase, a verifier checks that
The signature size and the cost of signature generation does not depend on the number of revoked members, but the cost of verification depends on the number of revoked members. To sum up, there are certificate-update-based revocation and CRLbased revocation. In the former, the cost of verification does not depend on the number of revoked members, but each group member needs to update a membership certificate. In the latter, each group member does not need to update a membership certificate, but the cost of verification depends on the number of revoked members. The previous certificate-based type group signature schemes that use an RSA signature over an unknown-order group for the membership certificate are not efficient because an SPK over an unknown-order group is inefficient than that over a known-order group.
A Nyberg-Rueppel signature, denoted by NR-signature in this paper, over a knownorder group was applied to a group signature 2) , which had been done independently with our works 16)∼18) . In their preliminary papers which published on Nov. 12th in 2002 and Jan. 15th in 2003, they fixed message M and used a signature on M as a membership certificate. Their revised papers, which were also done independent of ours, used a signature on a member's public key and not a fixed message as a membership certificate. Although they introduced an SPK over known-order group, it suffers from much work complexity because 12/18 of SPKs are constructed over unknown-order group. Furthermore, it does not provide the function of revocation which requires much administrative complexity if we simply apply a CRL-based revocation 4) on it. 1.2 Our contribution Our previous paper 18) uses NR-signature and only known-order groups. This scheme is based on a special case of Multiple Discrete Logarithm Problem(MDLP) which uses a q-order subgroup G P of residue ring Z P with two known primes q, p, P = pq and q|p − 1 in order to do all computations over known-order group. Apparently it uses rather special group. This is why such a special case of MDLP was pointed out to be solved. However, naturally, MDLP should be defined on an ordinary finite field because it is a variant of Discrete Logarithm Problem(DLP). So, in this final paper, we define MDLP rather naturally on an ordinary finite field, which forces us to use SPK over unknownorder group. However, we improve SPK that prove discrete logarithm over unknown-order group in a large interval, and thus, we hold the computation or memory amount down. On the other hand, our previous scheme does not satisfy the feature of unlinkability, which is also improved by using a random base in each signature generation.
In this paper, we present an efficient group signature scheme with CRL-based revocation which realizes the full features of unforgeability, exculpability, traceability, unlinkability, and revocability. Our scheme is constructed over both unknown-order and known-order groups to prove knowledge of having "valid" membership certificate. The use of known-order groups can reduce the size of group signature and computation amount of both signature generation and verification compared with a group signature based on RSA signature which uses only unknown-order groups. We use SPKs over known-order group as many as possible. Compared with another group signature based on NR-signature 2) with 12 or 6 SPKs over unknown-order or known-order groups, our scheme consists of 5 SPKs over both unknown-order and known-order groups, respectively. Our group signature efficiently proves to have a valid membership at one time. On the other hand, the group signature scheme that used NR-signature 2) does not have a function of revocation and, thus, we need to combine CRL-based revocation 4) to realize a revocability. This yields additional computation amount for signature and size of signature.
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize some notations and definitions used in this paper. In Section 3, we introduce new building blocks. In Section 4, we propose our new group signature scheme. Section 5 discusses the security of our scheme. Features and efficiency of our scheme are analyzed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes our paper.
Preliminaries

Notation
In this section, we summarize facts used in this paper. Let the empty string be0. For a set A, a ∈ R A means that a is chosen randomly and uniformly from A, and A \ {a} means that A − {a} = {x ∈ A|x = a}. Let c[j] be the j-th bit of a string c. For integers 1 
k for a security parameter k.
Number theoretic assumption
In this section we describe the security assumption used in our group signature scheme 14) . Let n be a composite number which is a product of two safe primes and G n ⊂ Z * n be a cyclic subgroup with unknown-order but the length of order n is known.
The probability that Problem 1 is solved by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm is negligible small.
Proof of knowledge
A signature based on a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge(SPK), denoted by SP K{(α 1 , · · · , α w ) : P redicates}, is used for proving that a signer knows α 1 , · · · , α w satisfying P redicates. We borrow five SPKs over known-order groups from 7), 9), 10), 20), 22), SPK of (1) a discrete logarithm, (2) a discrete logarithm lies in a larger interval, (3) representations, (4) a double discrete logarithm, and (5) a common discrete logarithm over different groups.
Let be a security parameter, q, p andp be primes with q|(p − 1) and p|(p − 1), and n be a composite number which is a product of two safe primes. We use three cyclic subgroups 
If a signer knows an integer x ∈ Z q such that y = g x mod p holds, such a signature on a message m corresponding to a public key y can be computed as follows:
( 1 ) choose a random exponent r ∈ R Z * q ; and ( 2 ) compute c = H(g||y||g r mod p||m) and s = r − cx mod q. An SPK of a discrete logarithm on an unknownorder group is defined, which proves a range of the discrete logarithm lies in a larger interval. Definition 2 [SPK of a discrete logarithm lies in a larger interval]
If a signer knows an integer x ∈]0, n [ such that y n = g x n mod n holds, such a signature on a message m corresponding to a public key y n can be computed as follows:
* is denoted as
where 
If a signer knows
mod p, then a signature on a message m can be computed as follows:
The above SPK can be also defined the case of an unknown-order group. Let order of the unknown-order group be smaller than is publicly known . The SPK over an unknown-order group can be computed in almost the same procedures as the case of a known-order group. 
A signer who knows the secret key x ∈ Z q withỹ =g 
New building blocks
In addition to the known building blocks summarized in Section 2, we introduce new building blocks of multiple discrete logarithm problem and SPK.
3.1 The modified NR-signature and the multiple discrete logarithm problem Before presenting our scheme, let us summarize NR-signature 19) . The original scheme is as follows. For a q-order element g ∈ Z * p , a signer chooses his secret key x ∈ R Z q and computes his public key y = g
is computed as r = mg −w mod p and s = w − rx mod q for a random integer w ∈ R Z q , which is verified by recovering the message m as m = ry r g s mod p. Message recovery signature schemes are subject to an existential forgery, in which an attacker cannot control a message. In a sense, it is not a serious problem because we can avoid such a forgery by restricting a message to a particular format. However, suppose that we want to use it for a membership certificate of DLPbased key like m = g t mod p. Then, by using a valid signature for a message m = g t mod p with a known discrete logarithm t, it is easy to obtain a forged signature for some known message m = g t mod p, in which an attacker can control a message of m . Therefore, we must remove such a defect from the original NR-signature to generate a membership certification of a DLP-based key.
In order to generate a membership certificate of a DLP-based key securely, we introduce another base g ∈ Z * p with order q such that the discrete logarithm of g to the base g is unknown. We restrict the message space for NR-signature to {g
We define the Multiple Discrete Logarithm Problem(MDLP), which is used for the security proof of our scheme. Let k be a security parameter, q be a k-bit prime, and p be prime with q|(p − 1), h 1 3.2 SPK of a discrete logarithm lies in an interval We need an SPK of a discrete logarithm lies in an interval for our group signature scheme. There is an SPK which prove a discrete log- Both SPKs cannot prove a value lies in an exact interval, but prove a value lies in a slightly larger interval. This is why we take the value in a slightly smaller interval to be proved. This restriction is also needed in 2).
In order to prove a discrete logarithm x = log g n y n for g n , y n ∈ G n lies in an interval ]a, b[, we define a slightly smaller interval of 
2 . From the same reason,x 2 < 2b 1/2 .) Next, he generates the following SPK.
In the previous version, we use MDLP on a rather special group 18) , which is easily solved for the reason of the group construction. Here we redefine MDLP on a general group.
This SPK is a combination of Definition 2 and 3. We show the above SPK is a proof of knowledge that proves a discrete logarithm x = log g n y n lies in an interval ]a, b[.
Proposition 1 The interactive protocol corresponding to
y n = g α1 n mod n (1)
From equations (1), (2), and (3) we can represent equations (4) and (5) g
+α 4 n mod n, and g
+α5 n mod n. Therefore we get
, and
, respectively, and thus, we get 
Proposed scheme
We present the group signature scheme, which uses SPK over known-order and unknown-order groups.
Functional description
A group signature scheme with CRL-based revocation consists of the following procedures:
Setup: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that for input of a security parameter k outputs the group public key Y (including all system parameters), the secret key S of the group manager and escrow manager, and the initial certificate revocation list CRL. Registration: A protocol between the group manager and a user that registers a user as a new group member. The group manager outputs the renewed member list ML. The user outputs a membership key with a membership certificate. Revocation: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that for input of the renewed revoked member list RML outputs a renewed certificate revocation list CRL corresponding to RML. Sign: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that for input of a group public key Y, a membership key, a membership certificate, and a message m outputs a group signature σ. Verification: An algorithm that for input of a message m, a group signature σ, a group public key Y, and a current certificate revocation list CRL returns 1 if and only if σ was generated by a valid group member. Tracing: An algorithm that for input of a valid group signature σ, the escrow manager's secret key, and the member list ML outputs the identity of a signer. In this paper, GM plays both roles of group manager and escrow manager for the sake of simplification.
Scheme intuition
In our scheme, GM generates a membership certificate almost in the same way as 2). The essence of a membership certificate generation are as follows. For a q-order element g 1 , g 2 ∈ Z * p , GM chooses his own secret key x GM ∈ R Z q and computes his public key y 1 = g
A user who wants to join the group, denoted by M i , chooses M i 's secret key x i ∈ R Z q , computes M i 's public key z i = g xi 2 mod p, and sends z i to GM. GM generates the modified NRsignature 3) (A i , b i ) on the user's public key z i as
To generate a group signature, M i generates an SPK which proves the knowledge of his membership certificate without revealing these values. We note that it is difficult to prove the knowledge of the membership certificate by us-ing NR-signature over only known-order group. Because it requires an SPK of two discrete logarithm over different groups are equal and the value of discrete logarithm in an interval, but there is no SPK which proves it directly. So, we divide the procedure of proving it into two steps: (1) Remainder Theorem such that
In order to avoid such a forgery, we need an SPK of proving the knowledge of
Any SPK of proving a value in an exact interval except a slightly larger interval have not been proposed yet. This is why they 2) put only the upper bound on A i as A i < 2 where 2 = p − 2 k+1 p 1/2 . However, the SPK of (8) proves 
Our group signature scheme
We present a new group signature scheme with CRL-based revocation. Let k and be security parameters and the initial member list ML, the initial revoked member list RML and the initial membership certificate revocation list CRL be null. A trusted party generates a composite modulus n and chooses a cyclic subgroup G n ⊂ Z n with unknown-order but the length of order n is known. Note that anybody does not have to know factors of n and the trusted party may also forget after the initialisation. Setup GM sets each cyclic subgroups G p ⊂ Z * p with order q and Gp ⊂ Z * p with order p for a random k-bit prime q, random primes p andp of such that q|(p − 1) and p|p − 1, and chooses random elements g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ∈ R G p \ {1} and initial revocation base g 4 ∈ R G p \ {1}, that the discrete logarithms are unknown each other. He also chooses a secret key x GM ∈ R Z q and sets y 1 = g
mod p. Then the group public key is Y = {q, p,p, n, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , y 1 , y 2 } and the secret key S = {x GM }. Registration A user M i who wants to join the group chooses a secret membership key
2 mod p, and sends z i
to GM . GM checks the validity of σ i and signs on M i 's public key z i by using a modified NR-signature ( 
and publishes the renewed certificate revocation list CRL = {V j | 1 ≤ j ≤ u}. Sign In signing phase, a group member has
We can also add an interactive protocol to make a user's secret key jointly by a user and GM.
to prove that he has a valid membership certificate and a group signature includes information of tracing and revocation without revealing any linkable information. Then we construct two SPKs by combing SPKs which defined in Section 2.3 and 3.2. In order to prove that the signer M i has a valid membership certificate (A i , b i ) and a membership key x i such that
(mod p) holds, the signer proves each format of left side and right side. First, the signer commits the right side for a random integer w ∈ R Z q to 
, choose a random element T n ∈ G n and compute
and (18) hold. Therefore, the signer can prove A i ∈ ]0, p[ by proving the knowledge of {A i , a 1 ,ā 1 , a 2 ,ā 2 } on equations (12) ∼ (18) . In order to prove that the signature includes an information of tracing, A i is enTp is chosen randomly at each signature for the reason of unlinkability, which improves our previous version 18) .
crypted by GM's public key y 2 to
and (9) , where (9) is equal to T 1 = A i y w 2 mod p. In order to prove that the signature includes an information of revocation, b i is embedded into
From (20) and CRL, a verifier can check whether the information of the signer's membership certificate is included in CRL or not. Now we describe how to construct SPKs on equations (9) ∼ (20) . The knowledge σ 1 on {b i , w} such that (10) and (20) hold are done by an SPK of double discrete logarithm. To prove the knowledge (9) and (11) ∼ (19) hold, known SPKs of Definition 2, 3, 4, and 5 are combined. Furthermore, to prove that (b i , w) is in both σ 1 and σ 2 , we compute
and add an SPK of the knowledge of (b i , w) to both σ 1 and σ 2 . In summary, a signer generates two SPKs,
mod p}(m). These SPKs are generated as follows:
p modp, and t 3j = g
n mod n, t 11 
mod p, and identify the signer M i from A i by using the member list ML. In our scheme, in order to realize the features of anonymity and unlinkability, GM has to keep ML secretly and sends a membership certificate to a group member through a secure cannel. This assumption is required in 4) and 2). To reduce the features of anonymity and unlinkability to GM, GM may be separated to two managers, the group manager and the escrow manager by applying techniques of multiparty computation to generate a membership certificate.
Security consideration
We use two different signature schemes in our group signature scheme. One is the modified NR-signature scheme that generates the membership certificate, and the other is SPK that generates the group signature. In this section, we consider the security of a membership certificate and the group signature.
Security proof on the membership
certificate The security of the membership certificate in our scheme is based on the difficulty of MDLP. We show the membership certificate is secure against any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries.
Let us define one more security assumption. For the security parameter k, k-bit prime q, prime p with q|(p − 1), and h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ∈ Z p with order q, a set of solutions of Problem 2 is denoted as
(mod p)} where the discrete logarithms of h 1 , h 2 , and h 3 based on each other element is not known. x , MDLP takes away any mathematical relation such as homomorphism from (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) by putting a parameter x 1 on both Z p and Z q . Therefore we believe that to solve modified-MDLP is not easy. We may note that there exists the modified version for strong-RSA 9) and that the similar assumption is used in 2) . More formally, the following experiment is executed with algorithm A.
Choose a polynomial-order subset
3 (mod p), and (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∈ X then return 1, else return 0.
The Modified-MDLP assumption is that the maximum success probability of Break-Modified -MDLP (A, k, q, p, h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) over all the probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is negligible in k.
By using Assumption 3, we can formalize the security of the membership certificate as follows. Let us define A be a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle Turing machine, which gets input Y and runs with a membership certificate oracle O C (Y, S, ·), which on input z ∈ Z p x outputs a membership certificate (A, b) . The adversary A may query the oracle adaptively. Eventually, adversary outputs a new membership certificate (A , b ) for a public key z and the corresponding membership key x . The adversary wins if z was not queried and
More formally, the following experiment is executed with the algorithm A.
then return "adversary failed", else return "adversary succeeded".
From the above discussion, the security of our certificate is proved as follows. 
mod p (27) +α9 n mod n. Therefore, we get
, and Then we apply the CRL-based revocation scheme 4) to 2). Let k = 160, = 150, q, p, or,p = 2p + 1 be primes with 160bit, 1200bit, or 1201bit, respectively, and n be an RSA modulus with 1200bit. Here M denotes the computational work of a multiplication over a 1200-bit modulus and u denotes the number of revoked members. We assume the binary method or the extended binary method to compute the exponentiation or multiple exponentiations 15) , respectively. Table 1 is a comparison of our scheme, an RSA signature based group signature scheme with a CRL-based revocation scheme 4) and another NR-signature based group signature 2) combined with CRL-based revocation 4) . It shows our scheme reduces both of sign and verification work by about 1/3, and signature size by about less than 1/10 of 4), maintaining the same security level. Furthermore, our scheme is slightly more efficient than 2)+4) while both use the same membership certificate based on modified NR-signature. Table 2 is a comparison of our scheme and public-key-registration type group signature scheme with revocation 6) , which do not use SPK of double discrete logarithms, which is required in our scheme. A CRL-based revocation needs SPK of double discrete logarithm. As a result, 6) is more efficient on the computational work for a small group. However, its group public key, signature size, and computational work depend on the number of group members, and thus public-key-registration type group signature schemes are less efficient than our scheme for a group of more than 200 members. The number of group members denoted by v. Table 2 Comparison of our scheme with public-keyregistration type group signature scheme
Conclusion
We have proposed the efficient group signature based on the modified NR-signature which has CRL-based revocation and uses an improved SPK that proves the knowledge of discrete logarithm in an interval. Our membership certificate based on the modified NRsignature makes the signature size and computational work of signature generation and verification efficient since they can be computed on known-order group. On the other hand an improved SPK uses unknown-order group but reduces the signature size by well combining SPKs of knowledge of representations and a discrete logarithm lies in an interval. Our scheme proves the possession of a valid (non-revoked) membership certificate at one time, and thus, it is more efficient than another group signature scheme based on NR-signature combined with a CRL-based revocation.
Our scheme uses the proof of knowledge involving double discrete logarithm in the same way as previous group signatures, which requires many computational work. Furthermore our scheme uses a membership certificate based on a special assumption of MDLP. Developing a membership certificate based on standard assumptions is a challenging open problem. Another interesting open question is to find the relationship among the MDLP and DLP.
